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«I prefer five minutes on television rather than ten thousand party members».
(A. Guerra, during the 1979 General Election campaign).
As shocking as this statement may seem if pronounced by the Vice-President
of a Socialist government (and even more if we take into account the fact that PSOE
was in opposition in 1979), it certainly expresses what a scholar has called «the
prevailing orthodoxy» on the relative influence of party membership and mass media
on voters’ behaviour (HILL, 1974: 215).
This largely held view, among both politicians and scholars certainly suggests
that the days of mass parties are over. The argument is well known, and it includes
such elements as the enfranchisement of all citizens, the changes in social and
economic structures in Western societies, the growing de-ideologization of politics,
the mass media revolution and their use in politics, the public financement of parties
and electoral campaigns, and so on.
The political implications of these new facts (mass dealignment, increased
electoral volatility, etc.) would make traditional mass parties decline: their traditional
organization and ways of action (membership-seeking, creation of local branches all
over the country, development of a network of «close-but-not-political» organizations,
...) would become more and more inefficient, affected by some kind of
«technological obsolescence».
Of course, the main variable at stake here is party membership: to what extent
is it relevant, in order to explain electoral results. In Section I we’ll review some
published research, while in Section II some suggestions will be made.
I. Some findings against the theory.
It is well known that the previously mentioned general interpretation has come
under criticisms. On a general level, Stein Rokkan suggested that communications
through mass media did not reach the mass public directly, but circulated in a «two-
steps flow», as more traditional communication. Therefore an organised network of
opinion leaders (i.e., a mass political organization) would still be necessary to
ensure a large diffusion of messages.
Some empirical evidence may be presented in support of this hypothesis. In
the United States, several studies have tried to measure the impact of local party
activity on election results. Thus, it has been suggested that up to 5% of vote in a
presidential election may be due to local party action (see CUTRIGHT and ROSSI
1958; see also CUTRIGHT 1963, 1964). This figure may reach 10% of the vote if
both parties differ markedly in membership and activity at the local level (KATZ and
ELDERSVELD 1961).
Several studies on Great Britain (see BOCHEL 1971; BROWN 1958;
DENVER and HANDS 1974) conclude that personal campaigning by party
members plays an important role through mobilization of potential non-voters rather
than through conversion of other parties’ sympathizers. This impact would therefore
be more important in local elections (where turnout is lower), while marginality (or
safety) of a seat shows a less clear relationship.
A. H. Taylor tried to measure campaign activity by the economic amount of
local expenses, and found considerable influence on results; on the other hand, the
growth of non-voting would leave more room for party action influence on vote, even
in general elections (TAYLOR 1972). Hill, while severely criticizing Taylor’s
methodology, reaches similar conclusions (HILL 1974: 216-217).
More recently, Seyd and Minkin have attributed electoral losses in the Labour
Party to reduction of membership and party activity (SEYD and MINKIN, 1979).
For Italy, an enormous amount of literature has underlined how high
membership figures, structured organization and «capillary» influence of DC and
PCI are the key elements in order to explain their electoral preeminence.
For socialist parties, two interesting studies reach differing conclusions. While
Bartolini finds no relation between changes in membership and electoral fate for
Western European Socialist parties (BARTOLINI 1983), Wellhoffer builds a model,
using as independent variables party membership, trade-union membership and
density of local organizations, and predicts electoral results very close to actual
results for Socialist parties of Great Britain, Norway, Sweden and Argentina.
(WELLHOFFER 1979).
Communist parties are perhaps a more interesting case, given their higher
homogeneity and the common fact of their exclusion from governments since 1950.
No general study has been published on this subject, but a mere look at Table 1,
suggests that there is no apparent relation between electoral results and
voter/members ratio. However, in cross-regional analyses within nations strong
correlations appear. In 1979, correlation between membership and vote, at the
provincial level was .84 for the PCI. In Spain, at a regional level (n=17), the figure
was .87 in 1979.
In our own research work, we have found correlations between communist
(PSUC) membership and vote ranging from .71 to .79, according to the level of
measurement and the elections under study.
An interesting comparison may be made between Spanish Socialists and
Communists in the province of Sevilla (which combines industrial areas and a strong
presence of agrarian workers with radical traditions). Table 2 presents average
electoral result and standard deviation of results, for each party in the 1977
elections, according to whether each party had a local branch before the election, or
created it after the election, or had not created one by the end of the year. It appears
that PCE was more a mass party than the PSOE in two senses: Communist vote is
more dependent than Socialistis on having or not local branches and, secondly,
Communist results are more homogeneous where it did not have a local presence
while Socialist vote shows a contrary profile: its results were more homogeneous
where it was stronger. In other words: local influence was much more important to
explain Communist vote than it was for PSOE.
What all these results clearly seem to suggest is that party membership,
organization and activity still make a difference. Of course, the mass media
revolution has entirely changed the «communicational ecosystem» of Western
societies, and parties have certainly had to adapt themselves to this new
environment. But parties still try to attract new members and to keep the old ones;
these members are still politically active in electoral and non-electoral periods as
well; and a certain amount of research work has found a visible influence of the
variables related to party organisation on vote and the outcomes of elections. Is it
possible to draw some lines towards a model to analyse vote as a function of party?
Section II will be devoted to this problem.
II. Suggestions and proposals.
It may be useful to take as a starting point Duverger’s Partis politiques: in spite
of the strong criticism it has received, it still stands as an important source of
reflections and problems.
It is often forgotten how largely Duverger draws on previous work and analyses.
More precisely, his distinction between «partis de masses» and «partis de
notables» rests explicitly on Ferdinand Tönnies contrasting paradigms of «society»
and «community» (Gemeinschaft - Gesellschaft), and the distinction suggested by S.
Neumann between representation parties and integration parties (NEUMANN
1932). Significantly enough, when Neumann expanded his tipology 25 years later,
breaking his integration parties class in two (total integration vs. democratic
integration), this new tipology matched exactly the one proposed by Duverger, which
included a third (and rather marginal, in his view) class of parties, which Duverger
termed as «Bund» - «Ordre». (See Neumann’s introduction to NEUMANN 1956).
Certainly, traditional «partis de notables» are not an important part of Western
European party systems anymore. Instead, what seems to be the main dividing line
today is the one opposing mass parties to «catch-all» parties; and, it has been
repeatedly suggested, mass parties would belong to the past rather than the
present.
However, we might take a slightly different approach to the problem by thinking
of «catch all» and «mass» parties not as two different groups of empirically visible
realities but in terms of a «continuum» along which we can place actual political
parties. The extremes of the «continuum» would be the «pure» definitions (in a
weberian, ideal-type sense) of catch all and mass parties respectively.
Figure1
In a weberian approach, ideal types do not have to be realistic descriptions of
facts but, rather, highly abstract and theory-oriented concepts. In my opinion, the
respective nature of party-voters linkages captures the most important and decisive
question in order to clearly differentiate our two ideal-types. Temptative definitions of
both might be the following:
For mass parties, the sole link between party and its followers (i.e., voters) is
the organized action of its members. Its electoral results will depend of (and only of)
its organized membership and activity.
For catch-all parties, members are not relevant. In a pure definition, their only
linkage with voters is the presence of party leadership in the mass media, and the
key question is the leadership’s ability to meet the political preferences of voters.
Party organization may still be useful for other purposes (e.g. recruitment), but it
does not have a linkage function.
Of course, no real political party fullfills neither of these two definitions. In the
real world, every party may be seen as partially catch-all and partially mass party.
However, this mixture will change from party to party, and this is the interesting point:
catch-all and mass parties are not two different, closed groups of parties; rather, we
may measure how far or how near is a given party from the extremes. Thus, we can
build (along the lines of those «pure» definitions) a set of indicators concerning such
aspects as programs (general, structured programs, vs. issue-centered manifestos);
press (presence or absence of party press); financing (party-raised funds vs. public
financement); links with interest groups (stable links vs. occasional support); types of
electoral support, in social terms (class, religious group, or some other kind of
differentiated support, vs. cross-cleavage support) or in geographic terms (strong
geographic contrasts, vs. homogeneous distribution), etc.
It is clear anyway, that the closest indicator to the «mass party» pole would be
party membership and, more especifically, its relation with vote. However, the
measurement and the interpretation of this relation will depend on, i ), hypotheses of
influences between membership, vote, and other variables, and ii ) the span of time
considered relevant.
i ) In a very simple version, general party action on its political and societal
environment is what attracts electoral support (fig. 2-1). However, it is also possible
that other variables influence simultaneously both party and vote; in this case (fig. 2-
2) the relation between party activity and vote is important, but superficial (spurious).
Figure2-1&2-2
ii ) Although party activity may be more easily measured during election
campaigns, in our «pure» definition a mass party (and, therefore, its membership) is
always active. The picture will then be different if we focus on a short period, or on a
longer time-cycle.
According to decisions taken on each of these questions, analysis would have
a different focus. Figure 3 attempts to summarize the four possible approaches.
Figure3
An attempt to measure the influence of party activity on vote during a short
period of time would tend to focus on electoral campaigns (upper left cell), as most
of the previously mentioned studies have done. In a longer time perspective,
however, it would lead to the study of subcultures, of «micro-climates» due to a
especially strong and regular party presence and activity (upper right cell).
If, on the other hand, research design takes both party membership and vote as
depending on other variables, a short term approach would tend to privilege political
events (such as a crisis, a change in government, and so on), while a longer time
perspective would perhaps underline social (rather than political) factors which would
make some contexts favourable (or disfavourable) both for party organization and for
its electoral results.
A point to be emphasized here is that possibly cross-national comparisons
make little sense. The posed relation between membership and vote is obviously
undermined by the fact that i), propensity to become a party member varies very
markedly between nations and ii), is in fact one of the key variables in the definition
of national political cultures while, on the other hand, it may be much more
homogeneous within a given country. That would explain why comparative cross-
national studies show little or no relation and cross-regional analyses within
countries show quite stronger relations, between both variables.
An interesting way of looking at the problem is in terms of regression (not
merely correlation) analysis. In the simplest model, where only membership (x)
influences vote (y) a simple regression equation would read as
y = a + bx + U
where a and b are the parameters (intercept and slope, respectively) and U, the
error term. Leaving U aside, it is tempting to interpret a and b in the following terms:
a equals the share of vote in those units without any party organization or
membership presence. Therefore we might term in the «national impact» of the
party, i.e., the electoral result exclusively due to its general electoral campaign,
leaders, etc.
On the other hand b may be considered the «multiplying factor» of
membership: to what extent, in average, a party member «attracts» additional vote
(thus, b may not be negative: a party is voted at least by its members!).
Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show an example of the relevance of these parameters:
correlation is strong in both, but the type of relation (and, possibly, of party-voter
linkage) may be different. (Actually, both are real: fig. 4-1 presents Spanish
Communists results, while 4-2 does the same for the catalan region).
Figure4
Of course, multiple regression designs should be used in order to include
variables as relevant as financement, organizational density, party press, and so on.
Some final remarks, in order to discuss how party strategies may be included
in this kind of model. First question to be discussed is, as we have already
mentioned, the span of time to be taken into account. Conscious party strategies are
most visible in electoral, or pre-electoral, situations: this would lead to put an
emphasis on the short term. However, parties also follow long-term, strategies. For
which of our «pure A» types of parties is each span of time more relevant? At first
glance, one would suggest two easy couples, catch-all/short term strategies, and
mass/long term strategies. However, the problem is not that simple, and deserves
more attention.
Secondly, the problem of adaptation to environment (which is crucial for mass
parties) requires also some kind of strategy. We should speak, then, about outside
directed strategies, and inside directed strategies, aiming at improving party
efficiency or perhaps to merely survive in a context which is more and more
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